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1. Dialogue and language 
Dialogue is always difficult. Even in the simplest exchange 
between two family members there is the danger of 
misunderstanding and confusion, and the constant possibility 
that despite a shared communication system, a language, and a 
common culture and situation, that an exchange rather than 
fostering understanding can be the source of suspicions, 
resentment, and conflict. We have just to take note of our 
experience and recall how many family feuds took their origin in 
what began as a simple verbal exchange between siblings. 
Something was said, perhaps now regretted by one party as a 
misunderstanding, that was seen as a provocation, an attack, and 
an indicator of the bad faith of the other party – and language, 
which is that which can draw us together, becomes the vector 
towards deep division and conflict with those who are nearest to 
us. 
 
The possibilities that language will destroy dialogue increase 
massively once dialogue takes on the character of negotiation 
between individuals or groups. Now differences of perspective, 
background, experience, and culture all add to the challenge of 
dialogue; and a common language is not only a pre-requisite but 
acts as a metaphor for all the other commonalities that must be 
in place if dialogue is to be real, engaging, and to lead anywhere. 
In our experience this is recognised by the appeals in any set of 
talks that we should be ‘Singing off the same hymn-sheet’ and our 
willingness to describe problems within a dialogue in terms of 
‘Not being on the same page.’ The challenge in such exchanges is 
to develop a truly common base language, coupled with the need 
to develop creative ambiguities that allow ‘wriggle room’ for 
those who recognise the basic common element in their language 
but also acknowledge that in even such a created common 
language there will still be problems arising from the diversity of 
the users of the language. 
 
Religious dialogue then presents its own unique challenges. Not 
only is religious language mythic and poetic in its origins and its 
practice – and so without the sort of definitional precision that 
can be brought to bear in many other human negotiations – but it 
is a language that works through the imagination. It is language 
which is analogical in nature, and when if it abandons that 
analogical manner of relating to the world – supposing that it is a 
directly descriptive of the world – it ceases to be worthy of its 
subject matter. We need to constantly invoke that fundamental 
principle of God-talk / religious dialogue: Deus semper maior – 
while remembering that we not only do not know what we mean 
by ‘deus’ but we cannot conceive what ‘semper maior’ means. Yet 
we must continue to use language for the only alternative, 
silence, does not do justice to that witness we believe we must 
make to the presence of the Holy. 
 
Ecumenical dialogue seems particularly problematic because it 
straddles these three levels of exchange. Not only do the followers 
of Jesus imagine themselves as a fictive family: being sisters and 
brothers calling on God as Father, but we form human groups 
who must negotiate and seek to reconcile our corporate 
differences, and the matters of our dispute are framed in terms of 
the complex theological stories we tell ourselves to make sense of 
discipleship. In short, there is probably no other area of human 
affairs with so great a need for a shared language, a means of 
talking to one another that leads to the diminution of division 
and suspicion, creative of shared understanding within cultures 
that have been at one another’s throats for centuries, and capable 
of being a means towards forging new respect for each other as 
sisters and brothers. The contention of this paper is that such a 
common language is further away than many think – and that 
this is a particular challenge for the Roman Catholic Church if 
ecumenical discussions are to be dialogue within shared faith 
rather than simply ‘being friendly with the neighbours.’  
 
2. Where are we? 
 
It is now over fifty years since the end of the Second Vatican 
Council and despite this being a period of possibly 
unprecedented change in Catholic liturgical practice, the style of 
theology practiced by Catholics, a different attitude to the other 
churches expressed in formal documents and different behaviour 
seen in various collaborations alongside a string of official 
ecumenical conversations, there has been no change in the 
official position of the Catholic Church on a central plank in any 
ecumenical endeavour: inter-communion1 and the related, but 
possibly more complex, question of the mutual recognition of 
ministries. This is an unpalatable truth when we Christians meet, 
and when faced with greater global challenges some feel that 
going back over older arguments, often phrased within a theology 
many of us barely recognise, costs time and effort that could be 
put to better use. Moreover, among many Catholic theologians 
there is a feeling that perhaps it is better not ‘to pick at sores’ but 
rather rejoice in what we now share: perhaps the problem will 
just disappear! 
 
Others argue that actual sharing in the eucharist may not be so 
important. Can we not be content with joint witness and agree 
that we eucharistize apart? 2 I do not see that as satisfactory for 
                                            
1 See, for example, the press statement of the German Bishops’ 
Conference of 27 June 2018 on ‘Pastoral Guidance on the matter 
of inter-denominational marriages and joint participation in the 
Eucharist.’ 
2 It is a fundamental supposition of this paper that ‘the eucharist’ 
is the name of an action of the gathered People of God in union 
three reasons. First, the eucharistic meal has been the gathering 
of Jesus’ followers since before they were known as ‘Christians’ 
and an important marker of identity. It would be untrue to the 
broad tradition to avoid issues relating to the eucharist even for 
some noble reason because that would suggest that eucharistic 
activity is peripheral. Second, as a Catholic I affirm the phrase 
used in Vatican II that the eucharist is the ‘totius cultus et vitae 
christianae est culmen et fons,’3 and therefore cannot be 
indifferent to the fact that, on the one hand, I may now greet my 
Protestant friend as a sister or brother in Christ in baptism, but 
also hold that they do not celebrate the eucharist.4 And third, this 
                                                                                                                             
with the Christ; see Thomas O’Loughlin, The Eucharist: Origins 
and Contemporary Understandings (London: T. and T. Clark 
2015) 42-8. 
3 The exact form of the quotation as used here is that found in 
Canon 897 of the 1983 Codex Iuris Canonici (Vatican City: 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1983). My rationale for citing this from 
the Codex Iuris Canonici rather than from the council documents 
directly will become clear later in this essay. 
4 This language of the eucharist as ‘the summit and centre’ of the 
Christian life is usually attributed to Vatican II, but it can already 
is not a recherché curiosity but an issue that brings pain, time 
and again, to fellow Christians who experience exclusion and 
rejection on the basis of this canon: ‘Catholic ministers may only 
lawfully administer the sacraments to the Catholic members of 
Christ’s faithful.’5 Unlike debates about reconciling approaches to 
justification or the relationship of the Bible / the Scriptures to 
theology, here ecumenical theology merges with the urgency of 
pastoral care. 
 
Moreover, after a short period in the immediate aftermath of the 
Second Vatican Council when this problem seemed to be about to 
disappear, there has been a growing hesitation among Catholics 
to engage with the problem as steadily one bishops’ conference 
after another insisted in their ecumenical directories that inter-
communion with Protestant Christians was not possible except in 
                                                                                                                             
be found in the chapter on the eucharist by the Anglican 
theologian, and famous World War I padre, G.A. Studdert 
Kennedy (see G.A. Studdert Kennedy, The Hardest Part: A 
Centenary Critical Edition (T. O’Loughlin and S. Bell eds; London: 
SCM Press, 2018, pp. 100-116). 
5 Canon 844, 1 (the translations are my own). 
very restricted circumstances – indeed circumstances that were so 
restrictive as to never occur in the course of everyday ministry. 
This restrictive approach fitted with the conservative approach to 
the sacraments during the papacy of John Paul II, and received 
added vigour during the rolling back of many conciliar liturgical 
developments that characterised the pontificate of Benedict XVI: 
any discussion of inter-communion attracted suspicious attention 
from Rome. It gradually emerged that, de facto, this was no 
longer an issue open for discussion among Catholic theologians.6 
The position that has become widespread is that participation in 
the eucharist is built upon the unity of the Church and, therefore, 
                                            
6 An excellent example of this tendency (hence it will be used as a 
test case in this paper) to present the question as closed is the 
1998 joint document of the three bishops’ conferences of the 
British isles entitled One Bread One Body (Catholic Bishops’ 
Conferences of England and Wales, Ireland, and Scotland, One 
Bread One Body, London: Catholic Truth Society, 1998) which was 
adopted, more or less in toto, by many other episcopal 
conferences around the world, and its influence can still be 
detected in the June 2018 statement by the German bishops’ 
conference. 
supposes formal unity prior to normal sacramental sharing. This 
widespread opinion has been given the status of some kind of 
theological axiom in the form, as used in the recent German 
bishop’s statement, ‘eucharistic communion and church 
fellowship belong together.’ This link is interpreted as being so 
intimate that they are, in effect, convertible terms: one cannot 
have communion without formal ecclesial belonging and such 
ecclesial unity is the prerequisite for eucharistic sharing. I refer 
to it as an ‘axiom’ not only because of its analytic nature but 
because it is not clear how this position is arrived at (apart from a 
generic citation of 1 Cor 10:17), and because it is seen as a basic 
premise in all further argument. Moreover, there seems no 
awareness of its epistemic or practical limits as a statement. For 
example, as a statement about the life of the Church as a 
community of limited, and sinful, human beings any reference to 
such theological and organic unity can only be imagined on the 
horizon of eternity. In other words, while the question of 
intercommunion arises in practical historical order of ministry to 
this or that group of people, the reply belongs to a meta-
historical order where ‘eucharist’ and ‘ecclesial unity’ are 
conceived, if not as ideals, then at least sub specie aeternitatis. 
Indeed, the moment of such ecclesial unity is virtually identical 
with the moment when sacraments as we know them on earth will 
cease. 
 
This unwillingness to examine the issue is, moreover, related to a 
more general fear in recent decades among many Catholics that 
any ecumenical rapprochement might pose a danger to their 
Catholic inheritance. Though it should be said that after almost 
every ecumenical statement, from whatever quarter and on 
whatever topic, there seems to some within every ecclesial body 
who are then fearful that they have betrayed an inheritance or 
blurred a necessary line of demarcation. 
 
This lack of discussion came to a surprising and abrupt end on 15 
November 2015 when a Lutheran, Anke de Bernardinis, asked the 
Pope while he was visiting the Lutheran Church in Rome if there 
could be movement on sharing together the Lord’s Supper? The 
Pope’s reply is interesting on a number of points – allowing that it 
has the quality of obiter dictum – but two are significant. The 
Pope asks himself: ‘“Is sharing the Lord’s Supper the end of a 
journey or is it the viaticum for walking together?” I leave the 
question to the theologians, to those who understand.’ And then 
he ended by saying he could ‘never dare give permission … 
because [he] does not have the authority. … [she should] speak 
with the Lord and go forward. I do not dare say more.’7 While 
canonists have been quick to point out that this is not strictly a 
‘papal statement,’ in the context of the implied invitation to 
theologians to examine the issues, it would be impolite to ignore 
it. It is as a response from one of those to whom Pope Francis has 
delegated the problem that I offer this paper. 
 
However, while this answer by the pope was greeted with joy by 
many who long for inter-communion, there seems no prospect of 
any resolution in the near future as witness the June 2018 
German statement and their recent dialogues with various Roman 
dicasteries.8 To many, both within and without the Catholic 
Church, it appears that the whole engagement with ecumenical 
issues by Catholic authorities lacks sincerity. One day it seems as 
if intercommunion is simply the next step in recognising our 
common belonging to the community of baptism as we make our 
                                            
7 Cited from Vatican website: papa-francesco_20151115_chiesa-
evangelica-luterana.pdf 
8 All these documents can be found on the website of the German 
Episcopal Conference. 
pilgrimage of faith as disciples because we celebrate 
eucharistically at the Lord’s table at which all of us as guests. The 
next day, the past seems to echo back around us in the form of 
formal exclusions, the contemporary form of anathema sit, and a 
presentation of the Catholic Church as the perfect Church. Other 
gatherings (who might self-identify as ‘churches’) are merely 
church-like (‘ecclesial gatherings’ in Catholic terminology) and 
can be characterised by their defects, while their eucharistic 
assemblies might not be anything more than appearances 
(‘invalid’ in Catholic language) due to defects in order (i.e. there 
is no one who has been empowered by the Christ to preside) or 
intention (i.e. they do not intend to do what ‘the [Catholic] 
Church does’ when it celebrates).9 
                                            
9 Very few Protestant Christians share the training in scholastic 
categories which allows them to enter into this language game 
and exploit its inherent contradictions, but one who did was the 
nineteenth-century Anglican theologian Richard Whately – now 
better remembered as a logician than as a theologian – in his The 
Scripture Doctrine concerning the Sacraments (London: John W. 
Parker and Son 1857), 78-91 where he discusses ‘intention.’ What 
sets Whately apart from more recent theologians as in that book 
 Is this swinging to-and-fro among the Catholic responses to be 
explained as a matter of ecclesiastical politics (some version of 
the conservative versus progressive dialectic we find in human 
organisations – and there is certainly an important element of 
this at work) or a lack of commitment (a form of bad faith 
whereby ‘nice things’ are said when in the spotlight of a world 
incredulous of the nature of inter-church disputes, but which are 
then not backed up in practice – and this is a feature of some 
ecumenical activities), or is there a deeper problem also at work? 
The contention of this paper is that, largely unconsciously, 
Catholics find themselves operating within two distinct 
‘languages’ – with what Wittgenstein would call ‘language games’ 
– which, while have many common elements, are fundamentally 
incompatible with one another. This use of two languages within 
Catholicism is a problem even if all the other factors, the ‘non-
theological factors’ such chauvinism about one’s own tradition or 
                                                                                                                             
we meet a case of religious antagonists, his approach could 
hardly be described as eirenic, using the same vision of 
theological language: both he and his opponents believe they can 
have a complete and comprehensive doctrine of the eucharist. 
someone’s personal conservative tribalism, are excluded. 
Moreover, coming to grips with this confusing bilingualism 
regarding sacramentality is not only important for ecumenical 
dialogue between the churches but for a more fruitful theological 
discussion within the Catholic Church. 
 
3. A common language? One Bread One Body (1998) as a case 
study. 
 
That there is such a Babel-like situation within Catholic discourse 
at the present time might seem to overstate the position. So my 
starting point is to look at just one actual example of this 
bilingualism at work. The case I take is the document issued in 
1998 not just by one episcopal conference, but by three – those of 
(1) Ireland, (2) Scotland, and (3) England and Wales – acting 
together, and entitled One Bread One Body. This is a good case 
study for several reasons. Firstly, this is surely a significant case 
of non-Roman magisterium within the Catholic Church in that it 
involved several conferences within a single linguistic/ 
geographical region. Secondly, it is not confined in its influence 
to the British Isles but has been used as a model by many other 
episcopal conferences for the expression of their position on 
intercommunion. It can be viewed, therefore, as a recent 
expression of what is seen as a settled matter among Catholic 
bishops. Thirdly, it has provoked a widespread debate of the 
commitment of the Catholic Church and as to whether 
ecumenical discussion regarding the eucharist can ever make 
practical progress. In particular, it has provoked a very 
thoughtful response from the Church of England which itself 
illustrates the problems of incompatible languages.10 Lastly, One 
Bread One Body while not adopting the formal lexicon of 
scholastic theology tends to default to scholastic categories and, 
more importantly, to express its basic thinking using one 
language while expressing its desire for unity and dialogue within 
another.  
 
Anyone reading One Bread One Body notices that there are both 
theological issues and issues of theological style in the rejection 
of arguments for intercommunion. However, trying to tie down 
what exactly are the crucial issues is far from easy – as becomes 
clear from even a cursory reading of the 2001 Anglican response. 
                                            
10 The House of Bishops of the Church of England, The Eucharist: 
Sacrament of Unity (London: Church House Publishing, 2001). 
Why there is this lack of clarity is itself surprising, given that (a) 
Catholic magisterial documents tend to pride themselves on using 
precise language and (b) there is a tendency in most discussions 
relating to the sacraments to begin with some form of definition. 
It is the argument of this paper that this apparent lack of clarity 
has far deeper roots within Catholic discourse of the eucharist 
than is commonly recognised and that explicitly identifying this 
issue is a preliminary, but necessary, step in dialogue relating to 
intercommunion. 
 An obvious presupposition of discourse, much less dialogue, 
is that there is a common language which is more or less 
understood by those using it. However, if we look at 
contemporary Catholic discourse we find that there are two 
languages relating to the sacraments, and especially the 
eucharist, being used simultaneously and rarely distinguished. 
The result is that both among Catholics themselves, and in 
discussions with other Christians there is a string of instances of 
that ambiguity.11 Both of these languages are ‘official’ Catholic 
languages (i.e. used in church documents) for the doctrinal 
                                            
11 This ambiguity takes the formal shape of being ‘fallacies of four 
terms’ (quaternio terminorum). 
exposition of the eucharist but are so intermingled that many 
statements allow contradictory conclusions to be drawn.12 It 
might be argued that these are conflicting theologies or 
approaches, but I think of them as ‘languages’ because each has 
its own lexicon, grammar, and world-created-by-language, and 
the differences tend to be far more opaque to the users, just as 
language tends to be. If one takes a theological position, that is 
                                            
12 Many of the disagreements among Catholics that have arisen in 
the matters of liturgical interpretation of Vatican II (e.g. the 
seemingly endless debates about the meaning of actuosa 
participatio: is actuosa to be understood as a binary term with 
potentialiter within a scholastic world of differentiating 
continuously between ‘potency’ and ‘act’; or does actuosa mean 
‘actual’ in general usage so that the aim is a community that is 
‘wholly celebrant’ – I take this rendering from Richard Hurley’s 
article ‘The Eucharist Room at Carlow Liturgy Center: The Search 
for Meaning,’ Worship 70/3(1996)238-51 at 238) can be 
explained in terms of these two kinds of language so when each 
claims the other side ‘does not hear them’ and both claim they 
are ‘simply reading Vatican II’, all concerned forget that there are 
two languages at work. 
usually visible in the statements one makes; but before one takes 
any theological stance, one adopts a ‘language,’ with all the 
assumptions that go with it, and it is at that level (which is deeper 
that the explicit theological content of one’s utterances) that the 
confusion arises. 
 
One easily recognized feature of this simultaneous use of two 
languages is that when any statement is made regarding the 
eucharist, in either language, very often Catholics feel that there 
is ‘still “something” more to say’ such than any one language, 
particularly the more modern language, appears to be ‘somehow’ 
inadequate and to call forth an iteration of older formulae lest 
‘something’ should be lost. This tension in Catholic discourse 
regarding the eucharist is usually explained in terms of a 
theological dialectic among Catholics such as the very familiar 
conservative versus liberal debate, or, more precisely, the clash 
between inherited ‘scholastic’ categories and the current post-
scholastic mode of Catholic theology, or, more simply, as a 
conflict between theological ‘principles’ or ‘models.’ But while 
there is an element of all these dialectical processes involved, 
there are still other factors affecting the Catholic approach to 
eucharist that need to be identified. 
 Before going further, it is a good idea to look at a simple example 
of these two languages being used simultaneously. In 1972 the 
Catholic bishops in the United States published a document on 
music which contained this, now famous, statement: 
Faith grows when it is well expressed in celebration. Good 
celebrations foster and nourish faith. Poor celebrations 
weaken and destroy faith. 
To celebrate the liturgy means to do the action or perform 
the sign in such a way that the full meaning and impact 
shine forth in clear and compelling fashion.13 
                                            
13 Bishops’ Committee on Liturgy, United States Catholic 
Conference, Music in Catholic Worship (Washington, DC: National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1972), nn. 6-7. The history of this 
statement demonstrates the hesitation that it generated: it began 
its career in 1968 U.S. Bishops’ document The Place of Music in 
Eucharistic Celebrations; it evolved in form in the 1983 revised 
edition of Music in Catholic Worship, and then in Sing to the Lord 
(2007). For details of this evolution, see Edward Foley, A Lyrical 
Vision: The Music Documents of the American Bishops 
The first of these statements has, over the past forty years, 
become an oft-cited principle among liturgists. Since the 
statement’s general truth is known to most people engaged in 
actual communities’ worship it seems to be little more than 
stating what should be obvious. Liturgy matters!14 
 
However, while the statement has been often repeated in semi-
official documents, it has also occasioned hesitation. In 
particular, the notion that a variable quality, such as that of 
performance, could be detrimental to faith has troubled many 
Catholics. There is ‘something else’ they wish to affirm. On the 
one hand, the notion that well performed liturgy is itself a ‘good’ 
and, therefore, contributes to producing a good fruit, the 
nourishing and fostering of faith, is not problematic. However, 
the idea that the efficacy of a rite could be so vitiated by the 
nature of the performance that it would work against the rite’s 
                                                                                                                             
(Collegeville, NM: The Liturgical Press, 2009), 22, 32-3, 43, and 
61. 
14 I have developed this at greater length in The Rites and Wrongs 
of Liturgy: Why Good Liturgy Matters (Collegeville, NM: The 
Liturgical Press, 2018). 
purpose and so be detrimental seems to overstep the mark in 
some way or other. Surely, many feel, a sacrament has its own 
reality, its own efficacy, its own intrinsic potestas and goodness 
whether or not it is ‘well done.’ The demands of ‘liturgy’ – when 
that term means more than the fulfilment of the ritual – are not 
that important that they destroy sacramental efficacy. Expressed 
another way: well-performed liturgy is a desideratum, but not a 
sine qua non. Indeed, having declared the opening statement to 
be obviously true (for most people somehow know that good 
liturgy builds up while they have seen many ‘turned off’ by bad 
liturgy), a great many Catholics would reject the notion that good 
liturgy is essential (certainly not if expressed as a ‘sine qua non’) 
for the liturgy is the liturgy however celebrated – and 
consequently good liturgical practice is ‘a bonus,’ an ‘add on,’ or 
a peripheral matter to the actual event of making the liturgy 
happen. This is not only an argument that is self-contradictory in 
its own process of thought, but one that takes external, practical 
form: one asserts the centrality of the eucharistic liturgy, but 
then ignores the fact that provision for a ‘good liturgy’ may be 
wholly lacking. Similarly, in seminaries there may be much 
attention to training to ensure that the liturgy occurs correctly – 
irrespective of situations, numbers taking part or occasions – but 
little concern with presiding skills, but at the same time repeating 
the theme that the presbyter presiding at the eucharist stands at 
the centre of the assembled People of God and that each 
eucharistic celebration is an authentic expression of this actual 
community. 
 
4. The differences between an empirical and a ‘Neo-Platonic’ 
language. 
 
How can we describe these two languages? Most of us, most of the 
time, and virtually always in contemporary scholarship, use 
language in an empirical way. We seek to describe what we are 
doing, why we are doing it, and ‘to give an account of the hope 
that is within us’ (cf. 1 Pet 3:15). Because we are describing living 
processes we do not imagine that our words wholly embrace 
reality: all our statements are imprecise, incorrect, and 
incomplete. We hope to improve on this situation by practice, 
education, shared endeavour, and a continual process of revision, 
and in all this our thinking is playing ‘catch up’ because as we 
revise our understanding, so too reality changes. We are trying to 
build – note it is a continuing activity – a base of evidence to 
allow us to move towards a better picture of the world, we are 
certainly doing more than seeking out ‘authorities’ and 
‘precedents’ (in the manner of a lawyer prosecuting a case) which 
demonstrate the inherent rectitude and perfection of our existing 
position.15 The notion that any book or set of ideas is definitive is 
fundamentally alien to us: there will always be more to say. We, 
without ever reading Karl Popper, just sense that every body of 
theory – such as the theologies we use today to make sense of our 
living out of faith – is only sound to the extent that it has not 
been falsified and so become the basis for our next revision. 
Likewise, we assume that words are provisional items of code: 
better expressions will come along, words will date and be 
replaced, and there is always an element of uncertainty that what 
                                            
15 This distinction between the lawyer seeking precedent and the 
historian seeking evidence is often ignored but vitiates much 
‘historical’ writing, particularly relating to sacramental theology 
that is used in Catholic debates. Thus, for example, a single 
‘precedent’ for the use of unleavened bread is presented as the 
basis for it being ‘an ancient tradition’ despite the fact that it is a 
ninth / tenth century innovation in the Latin west. In such 
debates the issue is not the raw fact of what was once done, but 
the entire language that is being used. 
I mean by a word is not what you mean. Rather than dwelling on 
this, we work with words and, when necessary, seek to clarify our 
meaning. Moreover, since words bring us to a shared pool of 
meaning, as distinct from encompassing a reality, there is always 
a poetic element in human discourse and this is always the case 
when we use language in religious contexts. This paper, for 
example, is written with these assumptions in play. 
 
But there is another ‘language’ with a long history in Christian 
discourse and which is, in particular, a part of the Catholic 
inheritance. In this discourse, language is, for those who use it, 
comprehensive of reality and, furthermore, its elements can be 
assembled to form in the minds of its users a replica of the actual 
universe under discussion. The internal world of the language, 
within the minds of those who use it and who regulate its 
consistency as a matter of mental discipline, is believed to be an 
exact simulacrum of reality.16 Now language builds a world which 
                                            
16 The fundamental epistemological flaw of this manner of 
thinking was exposed and parodied by Lewis Carroll in 1893 
when instead of a perfect map at a scale of 1:1 – which could not 
be unfolded as its damaged the crops – its inventors had to be 
so mirrors reality that a command and understanding of the 
language is equivalent to a comprehension of reality extra 
mentem. This imago mundi does not need constant revision, nor 
does it see itself as conditioned and provisional: it not only 
described reality now, but by relating to the essential realities, its 
insight into what is ‘really happening’ beneath the appearances, 
is transcending time: one know the parts of reality in their 
essential natures. When it succeeds – and sinful humanity will not 
always attain to this clarity17 - it is an ideal description of an ideal 
world. Of course, no one is so foolish as to imagine that they 
actually have this ideal language right now, but rather they are 
happy they are on their way to it and they certainly do not see 
understanding as subject to constant revision as new evidence 
comes to light: it is merely improved and ‘developed’ by a 
process of incremental addition. The historicity and particularity 
                                                                                                                             
content with what ‘does nearly as well’: ‘the country itself’ (L. 
Carroll, Sylvie and Bruno Concluded as found in The Complete 
Illustrated Works (New York, NY: Gramercy Books, 1982), 727. 
17 Traditionally, sinfulness both ‘actual’ and as ‘an effect of 
Original Sin’ were invoked to explain any ‘noise’ within the 
system. 
of knowing is not a foundation of this language but rather the 
noise in the system. Defects are due to human weakness or 
wickedness, but as in the classic image, derived from Plato, as the 
human being turns towards the light, the more that person is 
granted knowledge which rises above the ephemeral.18 
 
Intellectually, we reject this second view of language as naïve and 
dated. We imagine that it belongs only to certain schools of 
mathematicians, formal logical systems such as computer 
programmes, and an out-dated physics. But it is also the view of 
knowing and language that has a long history in theology. We can 
see it emerging in the work of Isidore of Seville (c.560-636)19 in 
parallel with the earliest collections of canon law and it 
underpins centuries of argument on sacramental theology where 
                                            
18 The Republic, 514a-520a. 
19 See Thomas O’Loughlin, “Isidore’s Hermeneutics: the 
Codification of the Tradition” in The Theory of Biblical 
Interpretation: The Latin Fathers, ed. Tarmo Toon (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 206-231; and “Isidore as a 
Theologian” in A Companion to Isidore of Seville, ed. Jamie Wood 
(forthcoming). 
many of the key notions used in argument had their origin in the 
early medieval period. It is not to be identified with the language 
of the university scholastics nor of the canonists, though they did 
tend to use it far more than they used the other, more 
Aristotelian, language. However, many of the basic assumptions 
of the canonists can only be appreciated by noting their use of 
this language,20 and it is principally (but not exclusively) through 
the use of canon law in Catholic sacramental discourse today that 
this language still survives. This may seem a bold claim, but it is 
always worth recalling that the system of the seven sacraments of 
the Latin church arose first among the canonists, while 
theologians such as Aquinas often used Gratian as the source of a 
fons theologiae.21 
 
                                            
20 See Stephen G. Kuttner, Harmony from Dissonance: An 
Interpretation of Medieval Canon Law (Latrobe, PA: The 
Archabbey Press, 1960). 
21 In Summa theologiae 3a, 73-78 – the central quaestiones in his 
treatment of the eucharist – Aquinas used Gratian on no fewer 
that twenty-two occasions; yet we rarely refer to Gratian’s 
‘editorial’ work in the evolution of eucharistic theology. 
More importantly, while canonists today will point out the limits 
of canonical understanding, the fact remains that there is a 
canonical understanding of the eucharist, it is known by Catholic 
clergy and affects their everyday life, and, consequently, another 
language for discussing the eucharist is present through the 
canonical language. This older language is invariably ‘running in 
the background’ even when people are seeking a renewed 
theology of the eucharist in study, a better praxis in liturgy, or 
shared understanding in ecumenical dialogue. So if we want to 
see this other ‘language’ we can do no better than to look at how 
the eucharist is described in canon law. In linguistic terms, this 
older canonical language is a source of ‘substrate interference’ 
with the common language with which Catholics would discuss 
the sacraments with Protestants. 
 
5. The vision of the eucharist in the 1983 Code 
 
 Canon 897 offers a canonist’s definition of the eucharist 
using the language of ‘centre and summit’ but it is the definition 
of a legal object which is encountered by Christians – most 
significantly there is no hint that ‘eucharist’ is an activity of a 
gathering of Christians. Christians relate to ‘it’ – the eucharist - as 
to something independent of them, they neither ‘do it’ nor do 
they create it by their actions when gathered. This is further 
expanded in the following canon, 898, which speaks of the laity 
and the eucharist who are ‘to hold the blessed eucharist,’ an 
object extra mentem, in reverence, they are to receive it 
frequently, and see it as the object of adoration. The sacrament is 
not an encounter here between the community and God, or even 
the community and the Christ, but is a distinct element in the 
divine scheme towards which there is an appropriate reaction as 
to an entity outside of themselves. Moreover, the eucharist has ‘a 
doctrine’ which is imagined as inherent in the object – rather 
than as a story of the community making sense of its activity. It is 
the duty of the parish priest to expound this doctrine, which is 
external to his own faith and understanding, and so any notion 
that a community can develop its own theology of the eucharist is 
wholly alien to this view. Likewise, there is no room within this 
view for the notion that a community’s theology of the eucharist 
is evolving through their eucharistic practice, their reflection on 
that practice, nor through their encounters with other Christians 
who might not self-identify as ‘Catholics.’ But we all know that 
actual theologies of the eucharist are continually evolving,22 and 
the experience of Catholics and non-Catholics worshipping 
together is very often a spur towards transformation in the 
understanding for both groups.23 
 
So how does the eucharist come about?24 Is it the action of Christ 
and the Church ‘by ministry of a priest’ (sacerdos), and there is 
no mention of the gathering – the assembled community, as such, 
                                            
22 See Thomas O’Loughlin, ‘Eucharistic Celebrations: the Chasm 
between Idea and Reality,’ New Blackfriars 91(2010)423-38. 
23 It is worth recalling that as recently as the early 1960s treatises 
on moral theology had a section under the heading ‘sins against 
the virtue of religion’ which included formal and material ‘co-
operation in false rites.’ While material collaboration (e.g. a 
Catholic nurse calling a non-Catholic minister to visit a non-
Catholic patient) could be justified as a human charity; formal 
collaboration (if that nurse answered prayers as if part of a 
congregation at the bedside) was forbidden. 
24 Within this language causality is a primary concern (which 
takes legal form in the concern over the exercise of a potestas) 
rather than the empirical question of ‘what are we dealing with?’ 
is therefore not an agent.25 Rather the gathering can participate 
in the reality (which exists anterior to that participation). This 
must be the case because otherwise a priest – significantly always 
referred to as a sacerdos26– would not be able to celebrate Mass 
without a community: but this is plainly absurd. Therefore, the 
community (apart from the priest) cannot be imagined as active 
in bring about the eucharist. This view, that the priest alone is 
active is then seen in the link the code makes between the 
eucharist and sacerdotal identity (such as an encouragement to 
celebrate daily ‘even if it is not possible to have the faithful 
                                            
25 Canon 899. 
26 Sacerdos canonically covers both presbyters and bishops but its 
use focuses on the attention on ‘powers’ and, since the use of the 
word is then applied to Jesus through a particular way of reading 
the Letter to the Hebrews and then taking back to the presbyter 
what is there said of Jesus, further problems ensue for 
ecumenical dialogue. For an example of the recent confusion of 
the two languages regarding this use of sacerdos in a semi-official 
Roman document, see Thomas O’Loughlin, “Are ‘the Bishops … 
the “High Priests” Who Preside at the Eucharist’?: A Note on the 
Sources of Sensus Fidei,” New Blackfriars 98 (2017) 232-38. 
present’27). That the priest – in virtue of ordination rather than 
position in the community – is essential is, for Catholics, 
uncontroversial;28 but it means that all to do with the gathering – 
indeed the whole realm of liturgy while possibly praiseworthy or 
ad melius esse – is accidental to the realities involved. Only that 
which can affect the ‘reality’ of the eucharist – is it or is it not – 
can have the dignity of full seriousness. The real liturgy is not 
what one takes part in, which one sees and experiences, at ‘a 
liturgy on a particular day’ but something other of which this 
celebration on this particular Sunday is but a momentary 
manifestation. 
 
But surely there must be at least a token congregation, a server 
justified as a token of the gathering? But that does not mean that 
it is not possible – and if possible, then the question becomes one 
of legality: and it is lawful for ‘a just and reasonable cause’ to 
have no other person present.29 Then there is the hoary old 
question of consecrating just bread or wine or both without any 
                                            
27 Canon 904. 
28 Canon 900. 
29 Canon 906. 
celebration of the eucharist – again it is possible, but it is always a 
crime (nefas est) even if for a good reason.30 Lurking here we see 
the presence of the late medieval discussions about the possibility 
of consecrating as a joke31 – and clearly that is still considered a 
real possibility. In entertaining this possibility we find ‘the 
bottom line’ regarding eucharistic presidency / presbyteral 
ministry: it is the stable possession of the power to consecrate; 
and we also see ‘the bottom line’ on sacramentality: it is a power 
                                            
30 Canon 927. 
31 This is the debate of whether consecration is an act done or the 
result of an intention, which in turn is seen to rest on the 
certainty of the a sacrament operating ‘ex opere operato’ while 
only ‘sacramentalia’ operate ex opere operantis (i.e. the intention 
being ‘a work’ of the worker). This issue has a long and complex 
history and surfaces in a variety of places, for example, in the 
1520 Bull of Leo X condemning Martin Luther, see Heinrich 
Denzinger – Peter Hünermann eds, Enchiridion symbolorum 
definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum / 
Compendium of Creeds, Definitions, and Declarations on Matters 
of Faith and Morals ([43rd ed.]San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2012), n. 1462 [p. 364].  
so delegated to the Church that it can operate independently of 
the presence of faith and worship. Moreover, we should note that 
these canons do not refer to what would be good clerical conduct 
(Canon 929 on wearing vestments would be such a rule) but the 
nature of the crime involved in doing such a thing as 
consecrating a barrel of wine as an exercise of sacerdotal power: 
that the ‘power’ is there is not in question, merely its 
inappropriate use. 
 
This naturally leads modern Christians to ask what image of ‘the 
Church’ underlies in such canons (and so, by extension, those 
who speak this language / operate this system)? The clear vision 
of the Church implicit in all these canons is that the lay 
community is an accidental aspect of the sacrament; and, 
consequently, it is not their liturgy in the sense of it really 
‘belonging’ to them as their activity. The baptised-who-are-not-
ordained, often referred to in the Code as Christifideles laici, are 
present at an event, but which is exterior to them in that it is not 
their doing. But if the community’s presence is accidental to the 
sacrament, in terms of the individuals concerned that presence is 
participation in a theological object; and that presence is 
spiritually beneficial to them. 32 Equally, it is not a communal 
participation qua tale, but individual participation by a collection 
of people (because the group is only an accident of quantity – one 
could add or remove individuals without affecting the reality of 
the event).33 So here we see the dissonance of the two languages: 
in the empirical language used by liturgists and in preaching we 
have words about the community as a real unity, with a presider, 
                                            
32 It is in the light of this thinking we can why rendering ‘ut 
meum ac uestrum sacrificium’ as ‘our sacrifice’ could be seen as 
significant: it is at the base of all justifications of ‘having Masses 
offered’ that the ‘sacrificing’ by the priest is ontologically distinct 
in nature and not simply in degree from the ‘sacrificing’ of a lay 
person – otherwise, how would having a priest ‘say Mass for X’ 
(and offering him a stipend) be different from any person 
‘offering Mass for X’? [and this reductio ad absurdum is the proof 
of the original premise: a priest’s place in the sacrifice is unique]. 
33 It is in the light of this thinking we can see why replacing 
‘credo’ by the more liturgically aware ‘we believe’ was so 
abhorrent to many in the 1973 translation of the sacramentary: a 
liturgical ‘we’ was an ephemeral accident, but an ‘I’ was a 
subsisting substance. 
and that acting as the People of God in Christo offering worship 
to the Father. In the other language, we have the vision of a 
rigidly divided two-tier church (sacerdotes /everyone else) 
engaged in two activities: the sacerdotes celebrating the eucharist 
and the baptised attending that event and by that attendance 
carrying out, singulariter singulis, a Christian’s obligations. In 
real life we now have a nasty set of problems of understanding: 
(a) which language are we to listen to as the genuine statement of 
the Catholic position; (b) are we seeking to listen to one but with 
the other as an ‘interference’; or (c) have we a macaronic muddle 
in which people jumble bits from both languages willy-nilly and, 
very often, unconsciously?34 
 
But does it do an injustice to the canons to say they envisage the 
eucharist as a sacred object, an ens brought into being by a priest 
(albeit usually in the presence of other Christians)? The canons 
see him preparing for the action and then making a 
                                            
34 What U.S. Catholics call ‘the culture wars’ about liturgy and 
interpret as a battle between ‘parties’ (one conservative / one 
progressive) can be better understood on a case-by-case basis as 
resulting from macharonic confusion. 
‘thanksgiving’ after it.35 The spectre of an infinite regress of a 
thanksgiving for thanksgiving does not occur to them because the 
priest is being thankful to God for the sacramental event which 
allows him to receive a sacred object, ‘Communion,’ and, indeed, 
for the gift to him of the power to celebrate, and, consequently to 
confect an event so wonderfully beneficial to other Christians. In 
this vein, the eucharist is virtually equivalent to ‘communion’ 
which is a substantial reality that should be received within 
‘Mass’ although it can be lawfully given outside it;36 and it is a 
legal requirement on every Catholic to receive Communion once a 
                                            
35 Canon 909. 
36 Canon 918. This issue of communion outside a celebration of 
the eucharist is, in many ways, a touchstone of how the two 
languages conflict: the older language argues from isolated ‘facts’ 
such as it can be done and is not wrong, therefore is cannot be 
forbidden, and as such presents no problems – and so there has 
been the rise of ‘eucharistic services’ as a response to a shortage 
of priests, but it then obscures the more important issues of 
appropriateness within a system of signs and the notion of faith 
as a sacramental encounter; see Thomas O’Loughlin, “Eucharist or 
Communion Service?” The Way 38 (1998) 365-74. 
year (and whether this involves participation in the eucharist is 
unclear).37 
 
However, the fullest expression of this reified, ontological 
approach is in the special chapter of canons on stipends given to 
have Masses offered for people (living and dead) and intentions.38 
Here the questions turn on quantities of Masses and it is 
presumed that quantities matter. This may abhor theologians – 
and there is a canon warning that there should be nothing that 
gives the impression of trafficking39 – but the fact remains that 
once one begins to count objects, then it means you are dealing 
with discreet objects with distinct significance. Counting implies 
quantity.  So we are back to the visions of Gregory the Great40 and 
the need for an exact number of Masses to deal with a precise 
                                            
37 Canon 920. 
38 Canons 945-958. 
39 Canon 947. 
40 Dialogi 4,57; and see Cyrille Vogel, ‘Deux Conséquences de 
l’eschatologie Grégorienne: La multipication des Messes Privées et 
les moines-prêtres’ in Jacques Fontaine, et al., eds, Grégoire le 
Grand (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1986), pp. 267-76. 
amount of divine punishment,41 which is still very much part of 
Catholic practice: indeed, ‘getting Masses said’ for the dead is a 
practice that continues long after any other faith commitment 
has disappeared. Meanwhile, both the diocesan bishop and the 
parish priest has a sworn duty ‘to apply the benefits of the Mass’ 
to his people on Sundays and holydays (this is quite distinct from 
any duty to actually preside where the community is assembled – 
which is not demanded by the law),42 but neither has a duty to 
give their people a well-resourced liturgy. 
 
6. The situation confronting Catholics 
 
I have not set out this synopsis of the Code as a vision of abuse 
but simply as a taste of what one finds there: this is the law that 
every Catholic cleric encounters and it provides the framework of 
his life. And this legal framework is symptomatic of the older, 
                                            
41 See Thomas O’Loughlin, “Treating the ‘Private Mass’ as Normal: 
Some Unnoticed Evidence from Adomnán’s De locis sanctis,” 
Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft 51 (2009) 334-44 which examines 
the origins of the notion in the Dialogi of Gregory the Great. 
42 Canons 388 and 534. 
early medieval, sacramental language. Simultaneously, that 
presbyter reads documents like Sacrosanctum concilium, books 
written in its wake, and hears the actual language of the liturgy: 
all of which utilize not only a distinct theology but use a 
‘language’ that relates to the world in a very different way. Our 
cleric may even hear part of the reply of Pope Francis to Anke de 
Bernardinis when he said: ‘“Well there are explanations, 
interpretations …” [as to why there are separations between the 
churches] Life is greater than explanations and interpretations.’ 
Could there be clearer example of how we ordinarily use an 
empirical rather than a ‘Neo-platonic’ language? 
 
But the fact remains that Catholics are continuously hearing the 
two languages of sacramentality intermingled and in close 
proximity – indeed it is this bilingualism that may lie at the base 
of many of the factional disputes within the Catholic Church 
today. For the cleric, one is a language that seems full of 
abstractions and comes to him at occasional lectures and in 
accidental reading; the other greets him every day in the sacristy, 
in the structures he is expected to maintain, and it provides the 
standards against which he is held responsible. He is like the local 
people in Brian Friel’s play Translations caught between two 
languages and who do not know to which world they belong. This 
is not just the choice between two theologies or two styles of 
celebration or even two cultures, but two non-compatible ways of 
imagining the world. With which do I interact? And confronted 
haphazardly and unconsciously by this question, most Catholics 
do not reject one in favour of the other but, again haphazardly, 
seek to keep both, oscillating between two worlds. 
 
In this paper I have used the analogy of two languages to express 
not simply the difference between the content of our theological 
discussion on one side, and that which emerges for Catholics 
from their canonical inheritance on the other, but also from the 
different ways each imagines the religious universe. One side sees 
that universe essentially as a mystery which is explored, 
interpreted and examined in an on-going endeavour that will one 
conclude with the eschaton: omnia exeunt in mysterium. The 
other is far more confident of its grasp of sacred reality and, as is 
the way with law there is a desire for consistency and coherence 
of the parts, thus an elaborate sacramental world of objects can 
be constructed. 
 
The weakness of the language analogy for this problem is that 
spoken languages are more or less equal in dignity: if I chose to 
use French as my language while you choose to use German as 
your language, then ceteris paribus we  (you and I), for the 
purpose of a convenient dialogue, simply opt for one of them 
perhaps by tossing a coin so that neither of us can be accused of 
dominating the other. But the older sacramental ‘language’ is not 
of equal dignity with the empirical language of everyday life, 
theology, and prayer. That language arose within a particular set 
of circumstances and was perpetuated within another specific 
situation, and, today, its continuance is both a distraction, a 
source of confusion, and a real obstacle to ecumenism. If we 
manage to isolate this older language of the sacraments in, for 
instance, our canon law, it may allow us to identify other aspects 
of that image of the eucharist as the sacred commodity which is 
perpetuated in a range of practices that surround eucharistic 
celebrations, while at the same time fostering a language for 
worship practice that can be related more directly to the other 
aspects of the Christian life. 
 
I am conscious that many more examples are needed to 
demonstrate the case I am making. In lieu of such repetitious 
examples I invite readers to consider situations both from within 
Catholic practice (e.g. the reluctance to consider the use of wafers 
from the tabernacle at the eucharist as a liturgical fault) and 
where Catholics’ and others’ practice diverge (e.g. that over most 
of the Catholic world communion ‘sub utraque specie’ is rarely, if 
ever, given) and observe how the notion of these two commingled 
languages helps to clarify what is happening in the liturgy. This 
particular confusion of tongues makes life more difficult for 
Catholics, as well as hindering all Christians in singing God’s 
praises with one voice. 
 
Finally, has this any practical implications for the Church as it 
continues its journey? We have notes already the distinction 
drawn by Pope Francis between sharing the Lord’s Supper the end 
of a journey and sharing it as the viaticum for walking together. It 
is remarkable that this distinction, which he drew apparently in 
the moment, mirrors almost exactly the distinction of languages I 
have been exploring in this paper. To speak of ‘ends’ brings us 
into the world of a metaphysics that knows essences clearly, links 
transient events to those within a known causal framework, and 
so can deduce actions (e.g. the inadmissibility of non-Catholics to 
eucharististic sharing) with certainty. To use the image of 
viaticum is to assume that every actions of frail human beings has 
a provisional nature whereby we seek to understand the divine 
mystery in fragments over time with the clarity of knowledge 
only becoming visible to us in the vision of God summed up 
neatly in Newman’s epitaph: ex umbris et imaginibus in 
veritatem. But if this second route is to be taken, then we need to 
acknowledge and abandon the Neo-platonic language and 
approach the questions with the searching openness, 
characteristic of empirical languages, not only to theological 
knowledge but of the messiness of human experience. This 
process, this language is always ragged and incomplete in its 
arguments and so we need to have a fallback that decides the 
benefit of the doubt – and for me that cannot be other than to 
adopt John 6:37 as a pastoral principle: ‘Everything that the 
Father gives me will come to me, and anyone who comes to me I 
will never drive (ekballo) away.’ On the other hand, we could 
adopt the notion that our language does grasp revelation to such 
an extent that we can construct a closed deductive system (or, at 
least, what approximates to such a system): the history of 
religions can furnish many examples of such confidence. Leaving 
aside the arguments for why such an option is a false path, we 
should simply note that in that case virtually all genuine dialogue 
with non-Catholics becomes impossible, as indeed it was taken to 
be until well into the twentieth century. And if we acknowledged 
that this language is our language for matters relating to the 
sacraments we would save all concerned much time and effort, as 
well as saving all who would seek to engage in dialogue with us 
much frustration. 
 
 
